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“The Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for

limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries.”[1]
I. INTRODUCTION
{1}
Pursuant to this Constitutional grant of power, Congress has enacted numerous Patent Acts, most
recently the Patent Act of 1952.[2] The limited monopoly granted by Congress, that no one may make, use,
or sell the patented invention,[3] now for twenty years from application,[4] is a property right, and like any
property right, its boundaries should be clear.[5] The scope of a patent, however, covers not only its literal
terms, but also all equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents, which renders the scope of patents less
certain.[6]
{2}
Prosecution history estoppel, a rule of patent construction, requires that the claims of a patent be
interpreted in light of the application process at the Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter “PTO”); a
patentee may not regain as equivalent subject matter surrendered when claims are narrowed during the
application process.[7] The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held in 2000 that when
prosecution history applies from any amendment made during an application process that narrows a patent
claim, it bars any and all equivalent for the element that was amended.[8] The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
on May 28, 2002, vacated this decision, unanimously holding that prosecution history estoppel need not bar
suit against every equivalent to the amended claim element.[9] Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court continued the
role of flexibility over certainty, overturning the Federal Circuit’s complete bar by estoppel.
{3}
This article will examine the doctrine of equivalents, prosecution history estoppel, and the Festo
litigation. This author concludes that, while still allowing for some uncertainty, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck the correct balance in allowing patent holders to use the doctrine of equivalents against copycat
inventions when claims have been narrowed during prosecution history.
II. PATENT LAW, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS, AND PROSECUTION HISTORY
ESTOPPEL
{4}
Pursuant to its Constitutional grant, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1790.[10] The later Patent
Act of 1836 required an applicant to file a specification and to point out the particular part, improvement, or
combination which is claimed as the applicant’s own invention.[11] The Patent Act of 1870 required a claim,
stating that an applicant “shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or
combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.”[12] The current Patent Act of 1952 [ 13] allows
an inventor to obtain a patent for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition or
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”[14] To be patentable, an invention must thus be novel,
[15] useful and nonobvious.[16] A patent application must contain a specification that describes the
invention in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use
the invention.[17] The specification must set forth the precise invention for which a patent is solicited, in
such manner as to distinguish it from other inventions, and from what is old.[18] The patent application must
also include one or more claims that particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter that the
applicant regards as the invention.[19] The application must also include a drawing when necessary,[20] an
oath and the current fee.[21] Once a complete application is submitted, the PTO patent examiner makes an
examination of the application,[22] including performing a prior art search. The examiner issues a first office
action, and provides the examiner’s reasons for any rejection of claims, such as the invention was anticipated
by the prior art or the claims are not for patentable subject matter.[23] The applicant may request
reconsideration in writing, and must distinctly and specifically point out the supposed errors in the
examiner’s action. The applicant must respond to every ground of objection and rejection by the PTO. The
applicant may amend the claims.
{5}
After reconsideration, the applicant will be notified if claims are rejected in the same manner as after
the first examination. The PTO can, on its own initiative, also request reexamination.[24]

{6}
If the PTO persists in the rejection of any of the claims in an application, or if the rejection has been
made final, the applicant may appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in the Patent and
Trademark office.[25] An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,[26] or a civil
action may be filed against the Patent Commission in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
[27]
{7}
If a patent is granted, the patent holder has the exclusive rights to make, use, sell, or offer to sell the
patented inventory[28] for a period of twenty years from patent application.[29] If a patent claim is
infringed, whether by actual or contributory infringement or the doctrine of equivalents,[30] the patent holder
shall have a remedy by civil action for infringement.[31] A court may grant an injunction “in accordance
with the principles of equity . . . on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”[32] A court may grant
damages to compensate for infringement together with interests and costs. The damages may not be less than
a reasonable royalty. The damages may be increased by the court up to three times the amount assessed.[33]
The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.[34]
{8}
One method of patent infringement mentioned above is by equivalents, under which a product or
process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to
infringe if there is equivalence between the elements of the accused product or process and the elements of
the patented invention.[35] The U.S. Supreme Court in 1854 approved of the doctrine of equivalents in
Winans v. Denmead.[36] The U.S. Supreme Court in 1950 set the modern contours of this doctrine in Graver
Tank, holding that a substituted element by a competitor did not fall within the literal elements of a patent
claims, but then looked further to see whether the change was so insubstantial to invoke the doctrine of
equivalents.[37] The Court in Graver Tank stated that the following factors are considerations for applying
the doctrine of equivalents:
What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the
patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence,
in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be
considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every
purpose and in every respect. In determining equivalents, things equal to the
same thing may not be equal to each other and, by the same token, things for
most purposes different may sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be
given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it
has when combined with the other ingredients, and the function which it is
intended to perform. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled
in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not
contained in the patent with one that was.[38]
{9}
The Supreme Court in 1997 unanimously held that this doctrine of equivalents existed after the 1952
Patent Act.[39] In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the Court, adhering to the doctrine of
equivalents, stated that “the 1952 Patent Act is not materially different from the 1870 Act” concerning the
role of the PTO, patent claiming, and reissue of patents.[40] The minor differences have no bearing on the
decision reached in Graver Tank and thus provide no reason for overruling it.[41] The Court, endeavoring to
clarify the scope of the doctrine, [42] stated in Warner-Jenkinson that equivalence “should be applied as an
objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis.”[43]
{10} The Court in Warner-Jenkinson further stated that the Court of Appeals did not consider prosecution
history estoppel, and remanded.[44] In the patent prosecution history, the PTO may reject a patent
application for not meeting statutory requirements for patentabilities.[45] The applicant may then narrow
patent claims. Prosecution history then estops the applicant from arguing that the subject matter covered by
the earlier broader claim was an equivalent to what was covered in the amended claim.[46] Prosecution
history estoppel precludes a patent holder regaining subject matter relinquished in an amended claim.[47]
{11}

Both the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel were at issue in Festo.[48]

III. FESTO CORP. v. SHOKETSU KINZOKU KOGYO KABUSHIKI CO.
{12} Festo Corp. owns two patents, the Stoll patent and the Carroll patent, both relating to magnetically
coupled rodless cylinders. The cylinder “moves by magnetic attraction to the piston, which is moved
hydraulically or pneumatically.”[49] The Carroll patent issued in 1973 [50] and expired in 1990.[51] A
reexamination certificate was issued in 1988 with amended claims, and during the reexamination, Carroll
canceled claim 1 and added claim 9.[52] The Stoll patent was filed in 1980 as the U.S. counterpart of a
German patent application. [53] In the first office action, all twelve original claims were rejected by the
patent examiner. Some claims were amended, others were canceled. The patent issued in 1982.[54]
{13} After Festo began selling its device, Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., and SMC
Pneumatics, Inc. (hereinafter collectively “SMC”), entered the market with a similar device. Festo sued SMC
in a district court for infringement of both the Carroll and Stoll patents. Before trial, the district court granted
Festo’s motion for partial summary judgment concerning the Carroll patent.[55] All the claim elements were
conceded to be literally present in the allegedly infringing devices except two. [56] The district court
granted summary judgment on infringement of the Carroll patent under the doctrine of equivalents.[57] The
remaining issues were tried to a jury, which found both patents valid, found the Stoll patent infringed by the
doctrine of equivalents, and assessed damages.[58]
{14} SMC appealed to the Federal Circuit, raising for the first time the issue of prosecution history
estoppel.[59] On appeal, Festo argued that the prosecution history estoppel does not bar a finding of
equivalence when a term in the claim was not required.[60] In Festo, during prosecution, the sleeve being
magnetized was added. The reason for the addition was disputed at trial, and the judge called the addition a
“mystery.”[61] The Court of Appeals held that, in determining whether prosecution history estoppel applies,
the court must consider both what has changed and the reason for the change in light of the prior art in the
field.[62] The Court of Appeals affirmed both the summary judgment of infringement of the Carroll patent
as well as the damages awarded by the jury.[63]
{15} The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit in
light of Warner-Jenkinson.[64] The Federal Circuit reheard the appeal en banc.[65]
{16} On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit acknowledged the importance of the
doctrine of equivalents to prevent an accused infringer to avoid liability for only minor or insubstantial
changes.[66] According to the Federal Circuit, the exact range of equivalents when prosecution history
estoppel applies is virtually unascertainable under the preceding, more flexible approach to the doctrine.[67]
Thus the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that a complete bar eliminates the public’s need to speculate as to
the subject matter surrendered by an amendment that narrows a claim.[68] Even though no explanation for
the amendments narrowing the scope of the claims was established, the Court held that the amendments gave
rise to prosecution history estoppel and thus may not be infringed by equivalence.[69]
{17} In a concurrence, Judge Lourie stated that he believed that the Federal Circuit’s new rule would
provide a clear net gain for innovation and the public, who would gain by greater certainty.[70] New
innovations could be developed without fear of protracted innovation.[71] This case once again went to the
U.S. Supreme Court.[72]
{18} Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, stated in an opinion issued May 28, 2002, that the
Court once again was required to address the relation between two patent law concepts, the doctrine of
equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel.[73] Although the Court had considered the same
concepts five years earlier in Warner-Jenkinson,[74] the Federal Circuit subsequently held that a patent
applicant surrenders all equivalents when claims are narrowed during patent prosecution.[75] In a sharply
worded opinion, Justice Kennedy stated, “[t]he Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson,
which instructed that courts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of
the inventing community.”[76]

IV. CONCLUSION
{19} The U.S. Supreme Court in Festo thus retained the flexible rule, that prosecution history estoppel
does not bar suit against every equivalent of every amended claim. The Court acknowledged that this can
create substantial uncertainty about where the patent monopoly ends.[77] “Each time the Court has
considered the doctrine, it has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate
incentives for innovation.”[78]
{20} This author agrees with the Court’s decision. The Court struck a balance between innovation and
certainty. Under the doctrine of equivalents, a patent holder should be able to protect against not only a
literal infringer, but also those who design around the patent application, and create nearly equivalent,
although not identical, versions. On the other hand, an inventor should not be able to recoup what has been
narrowed during prosecution history estoppel by the doctrine of equivalents. This prosecution history
estoppel, however, should not be a complete bar to all elements narrowed, regardless of the purpose, as held
by the Federal Circuit. Had the Federal Circuit’s decision been upheld, many patent holders would have lost
equivalence for many claims narrowed for any reason, which was not anticipated if these patent holders
relied on prior court precedent. In the author’s opinion, the Court was correct in holding that certainty is not
a sufficient reason to overthrow this precedent and reliance.
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